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SOUND THE ALARM:
LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY
IN ALARM SERVICE CONTRACTS
Joshua N. Cohen*
Home and business owners increasingly rely on alarm systems to protect
against theft and property damage. When a burglary or fire occurs and an
alarm service customer discovers that the alarm company negligently failed
to call the police or fire department, the customer understandably would
expect redress for the company’s failure to provide its service. Many
customers would be surprised, though, to discover that an alarm company’s
liability is often contractually limited to a relatively token amount unrelated
to the cost of the service, even when the alarm company is negligent.
Some states view these limitations of liability as exculpatory clauses and
determine their enforceability based on whether they are unconscionable or
violate public policy. Other states view them as liquidated damages and
apply a penalty test to determine their enforceability. This Note addresses
the differences between these two approaches in the context of the unique
remedy difficulties inherent in alarm service contracts. This Note then
argues that the prevailing policy rationales for enforcing alarm service
provisions that limit a party’s liability for its own negligence are misguided
and advocates that these provisions should not be enforced as a matter of
public policy.
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INTRODUCTION
After a long day of work, the manager of a grocery store ends his evening
shift, as he always does, by setting the store’s burglar alarm and locking the
building. Just as he is about to get in his car and head home for the day,
however, an armed robber accosts him in the parking lot and forces him to
return to the store at gunpoint. Against his will, the manager leads the
robber into the grocery’s inner office and opens the store’s safe. The robber
then ties up the manager with tape and proceeds to empty the safe.
Throughout this terrifying ordeal, the manager’s only comfort was that he
did not disarm the burglar alarm when he unlocked the store. Surely the
police would arrive soon.
Despite receiving the alarm signal, the burglar alarm company does not
notify the police, and the robber makes his getaway fourteen minutes after
the alarm first activates. It is not until after the robber flees with over
$35,000 from the safe that the manager, still bound with tape, is able to
maneuver to a telephone and call for help. The police arrive two minutes
later—too late to catch the robber.
This scenario is based on the facts of Better Food Markets v. American
District Telephone Co.,1 where the California Supreme Court ruled there
was sufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably find that the alarm
company’s failure to perform its contractual duty to notify the police was
the proximate cause of the grocery store’s $35,930 loss.2 Nevertheless, the

1. 253 P.2d 10 (Cal. 1953).
2. Id. at 12–13.
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court limited the grocery store’s recovery to $50.3 Why only $50? Because
the burglar alarm contract provided that “liability . . . shall be limited to and
fixed at the sum of fifty dollars as liquidated damages, and not as a penalty,
and this liability shall be exclusive.”4
Many home and business monitoring service contracts contain similar
provisions5 and customers, who are often surprised to find that these
provisions apply even when the alarm company is at fault, have a strong
incentive to challenge the enforceability of these clauses.6 Different states
apply different tests to determine the enforceability of contract clauses that,
like the provision in Better Food Markets, limit a party’s liability to a
specific dollar amount for damages caused by negligence.7
Scholars have observed the distinction between liquidated damages and
limitation-of-liability clauses,8 discussed the enforceability of exculpatory9
and liquidated damages10 clauses in general, and examined the
enforceability of limitation-of-liability clauses in specific areas such as
professional service contracts.11 However, none have addressed the unique
policy concerns generated by limitation-of-liability clauses in alarm service
contracts. This Note discusses the inconsistent manner in which states
determine the enforceability of such provisions and analyzes whether these
provisions should be enforced. Some jurisdictions, such as Connecticut,

3. Id. at 16.
4. Id. at 13.
5. See generally Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and
Application of Exculpatory and Limitation of Liability Clauses in Burglary, Fire, and Other
Home and Business Monitoring Service Contracts, 36 A.L.R.6th 305 (2008).
6. See Eric Dexheimer, With Failures, Alarm Companies Have Little Liability,
MYSTATESMAN (Jan. 25, 2014, 7:48 PM), http://www.mystatesman.com/news/news/withfailures-alarm-companies-have-little-liabilit/nc3Dj/ [https://perma.cc/6WAP-DTQY]. As
alarm systems grow more sophisticated, these lawsuits may become more common. See
Complaint at 1, Hernandez v. ADT Corp., No. 9:16-cv-80335 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 7, 2016)
(alleging that ADT’s wireless signals can be “intercepted and interfered with by
unauthorized third parties”); see also Emily Field, Suit Says ADT Security Systems Leave
Homes Vulnerable, LAW360 (Mar. 8, 2016, 4:51 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/
768812 [https://perma.cc/XT9T-7LCY]; Kashmir Hill, How Your Security System Could Be
Hacked to Spy on You, FORBES (July 23, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/kashmirhill/2014/07/23/how-your-security-system-could-be-used-to-spy-on-you/#3bf21
146198b [https://perma.cc/2X9X-RDRB].
7. See infra Part II.
8. See generally William F. Fritz, “Underliquidated” Damages as Limitation of
Liability, 33 TEX. L. REV. 196 (1954); Debora L. Threedy, Liquidated and Limited Damages
and the Revision of Article 2: An Opportunity to Rethink the U.C.C.’s Treatment of Agreed
Remedies, 27 IDAHO L. REV. 427 (1991); Elizabeth Warren, Formal and Operative Rules
Under Common Law and Code, 30 UCLA L. REV. 898 (1983).
9. See generally Scott J. Burnham, Are You Free to Contract Away Your Right to Bring
a Negligence Claim?, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 379 (2014); Lynn Guissinger, Note,
Exculpatory Clauses and Public Policy: A Judicial Dilemma, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 793
(1982).
10. See generally Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties
and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory
of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977).
11. See generally John Terwilleger, Note, Can a Professional Limit Liability
Contractually Under Florida Law?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1351 (2013).
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have yet to definitively weigh in on which test they will use,12 providing
them with an opportunity to choose the best method of determining the
enforceability of these limitation-of-liability provisions.
Part I of this Note provides an overview of three types of contractual
provisions that manage liability: exculpatory clauses, liquidated damages
clauses, and limitation-of-liability clauses. Part II explores the two primary
tests that states use to determine the enforceability of limitation-of-liability
clauses like the clause in Better Food Markets. Finally, Part III considers
the better test to determine the enforceability of limitation-of-liability
clauses that limit a party’s liability to a specific dollar amount for damages
caused by negligence. It then argues that such clauses should not be
enforceable in alarm service contracts—courts should find them
unconscionable, and legislatures should declare them void as a matter
public policy.
I. EXCULPATORY, LIQUIDATED DAMAGES,
AND LIMITATION-OF-LIABILITY CLAUSES:
THREE METHODS TO MANAGE LIABILITY
Contracts often contain provisions designed to limit the scope of a party’s
liability. Exculpatory clauses are designed to relieve a party from liability
for a negligent or wrongful act.13 Liquidated damages clauses determine, in
advance, the measure of damages if a party breaches a contract.14 A hybrid
of these two types of contractual clauses, limitation-of-liability clauses,
restrict the measure of damages regardless of the actual damages ultimately
suffered.15 Unlike liquidated damages clauses, limitation-of-liability
clauses do not purport to estimate the harm caused by a breach.16 In
contrast to exculpatory clauses, however, limitation-of-liability clauses do
not completely disclaim liability for a party’s negligence; rather, such
clauses limit recoverable damages beyond a specific (maximum) dollar
amount.17
Part I.A discusses exculpatory clauses and the traditional methods of
determining their enforceability:
addressing whether a contract is
procedurally and substantively unconscionable or whether the clause
violates public policy. Part I.B discusses liquidated damages clauses,
distinguishes between overliquidated and underliquidated damages, and
details the traditional tests to determine their enforceability. Finally, Part
12. See infra Part II.C.
13. See Exculpatory Clause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
14. Liquidated Damages Clause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
15. See Nahra v. Honeywell, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 962, 969 (N.D. Ohio 1995).
16. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 339 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1932).
17. See Wedner v. Fid. Sec. Sys., Inc., 307 A.2d 429, 431 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973)
(describing a limitation-of-liability clause as allowing recovery up to a contracted amount,
beyond which further recovery is unavailable); Terwilleger, supra note 11, at 1365 (“[T]here
is a key difference between exculpatory clauses and limitation of liability clauses, because an
exculpatory clause ‘insulates a party from liability,’ while a limitation of liability clause
‘merely places a limit upon that liability.’” (quoting Valhal Corp. v. Sullivan Assocs., Inc.,
44 F.3d 195, 202 (3d Cir. 1995))).
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I.C describes limitation-of-liability clauses in alarm service contracts—the
primary focus of this Note—and addresses whether they should be
characterized as exculpatory clauses or liquidated damages clauses for
enforceability purposes.
A. Exculpatory Clauses, Unconscionability,
and Public Policy
To determine the enforceability of an exculpatory clause that denies an
injured party the right to recover damages from another’s negligence, courts
typically analyze whether the clause is unconscionable or void as a matter
of public policy.18 Part I.A.1 and I.A.2 provide an overview of
unconscionability doctrine and public policy considerations, respectively.
1. Unconscionability Doctrine
Unconscionability refers to the “absence of meaningful choice on the part
of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably
favorable to the other party.”19 Traditionally, a contract was said to be
unconscionable if it was “such as no man in his senses and not under
delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would
accept on the other.”20 Today, a showing of unconscionability generally
requires two elements: procedural unconscionability and substantive
unconscionability.21
Procedural unconscionability refers to “whether the imposed-upon party
had meaningful choice about whether and how to enter into the
transaction.”22 By itself, an unequal bargaining position between parties
does not make a contract procedurally unconscionable.23 However, gross
inequality of bargaining power weighs in favor of finding that the weaker
party had no meaningful choice in assenting to the contract’s terms,
especially in the presence of factors such as
belief by the stronger party that there is no reasonable probability that the
weaker party will fully perform the contract; knowledge of the stronger
party that the weaker party will be unable to receive substantial benefits
from the contract; [and] knowledge of the stronger party that the weaker
18. See 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 283 (2004).
19. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
accord Desiderio v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 191 F.3d 198, 207 (2d Cir. 1999).
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (quoting
Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889)).
21. See 8 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 18:10 (4th ed. 2010); see also Burnham, supra note 9, at 381 (“In the classical
construct both [procedural and substantive unconscionability] are necessary for a finding of
unconscionability.”).
22. 8 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 21, § 18:10. Indeed, one of the fundamental
rationales for setting aside contracts as unconscionable is to protect “parties with weak
bargaining power from contractual overreaching by those with stronger bargaining power.”
Stephen Friedman, Arbitration Provisions: Little Darlings and Little Monsters, 79
FORDHAM L. REV. 2035, 2043 (2011).
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d.
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party is unable reasonably to protect his interests by reason of physical or
mental infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy or inability to understand the
language of the agreement, or similar factors.24

For example, a contract may be procedurally unconscionable where the
nondrafting party with an obvious lack of education did not have a
reasonable opportunity to understand the contract’s terms because the terms
were “hidden in a maze of fine print and minimized by deceptive sales
practices.”25
Often, exculpatory clauses are found in standard-form contracts that are
offered on a “take it or leave it” basis, known as contracts of adhesion.26
However, the mere fact that an exculpatory clause appears in an adhesion
contract is not enough to establish procedural unconscionability.27 Instead,
“[t]here must be an additional showing of great disparity in bargaining
power between the parties, of lack of opportunity for negotiation, or of
inability to obtain the offered services elsewhere.”28 In contracts between
large businesses and consumers, the ability of the consumer to obtain the
services elsewhere is often the dispositive factor in determining procedural
unconscionability.29 As long as the consumer is free to “leave it”—forgo
the service or obtain it elsewhere—even an adhesion contract is unlikely to
be procedurally unconscionable.30 Accordingly, the existence of a market
for the service weighs against a finding of procedural unconscionability.31
This is consistent with economists’ views that exculpatory clauses, like
other contract terms, are “matter[s] of individual liberty that should be left
to the market.”32
Substantive unconscionability refers to whether the terms of a contract
are unreasonably favorable to the stronger party.33 Factors that favor a
finding of substantive unconscionability include terms that contravene
public interest or public policy, terms that impermissibly alter fundamental
duties imposed by law, provisions that negate the reasonable expectations
of the nondrafting party, and terms that are unreasonably and unexpectedly
harsh that benefit the drafting party at the nondrafting party’s expense.34
When determining substantive unconscionability, courts look for “terms
that are so oppressive that no reasonable person would make them and no
fair and honest person would accept them.”35 Notably, courts will not

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
See Burnham, supra note 9, at 381; Guissinger, supra note 9, at 795.
See Burnham, supra note 9, at 381.
Guissinger, supra note 9, at 795.
See id. at 798.
See id. at 799–800.
Burnham, supra note 9, at 383.
Id. at 380.
See 8 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 21, § 18:10.
Id.
Burnham, supra note 9, at 384.
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enforce exculpatory clauses that attempt to insulate a tortfeasor from
gross—willful or wanton—negligence.36
To determine the overall enforceability of a provision, courts often
balance procedural and substantive unconscionability.37 In this manner,
“the greater the harshness or unreasonableness of the substantive terms, the
less important the regularity of the process of contract formation that gave
rise to the term becomes.”38 Likewise, “[w]hen there is clear procedural
unconscionability, . . . even minimal substantive unfairness may be enough
to justify declaring the contract or clause unconscionable, and even a
substantively fair bargain may be declared unconscionable if the procedural
defects are great enough.”39
2. Public Policy
Closely related to the notion that a court should not enforce an
unconscionable contract is the doctrine that a court should not enforce a
contract that violates public policy. A finding that a provision violates
public policy is based on the idea that “an obligation of care owed by one
person to another outweigh[s] [the] traditional regard for freedom of
While public policy determinations depend on the
contract.”40
circumstances of each case,41 the Supreme Court of California articulated
six commonly cited factors42 in Tunkl v. Regents of University of
California43 typical of exculpatory clauses that are invalid as against public
policy: (1) the business is “generally thought suitable for public
regulation”; (2) the service is of great importance to the public and “often a
matter of practical necessity for some members of the public”; (3) the
service provider holds itself out as willing to provide it to any member of
the public (who meets certain established standards); (4) because of the
essential nature of the service, the provider has a decisive advantage in
bargaining power; (5) the provider employs standardized contracts and
makes no provision for purchasers to pay an additional (reasonable) fee to
protect against negligence; and (6) “as a result of the transaction, the person
or property of the purchaser is placed under the control of the seller, subject
to the risk of carelessness by the seller or his agents.”44
In summary, a court may refuse to enforce an exculpatory clause that
denies an injured party the right to recover damages from another’s
negligence if the court finds that the clause is unconscionable or contrary to
public policy. After such a finding, a court may (1) refuse to enforce the
36. See Fritz, supra note 8, at 209; Guissinger, supra note 9, at 795 n.6 (citing Jones v.
Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 376 (Colo. 1981)).
37. See 8 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 21, § 18:14.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Scott v. Pac. W. Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6, 11 (Wash. 1992).
41. See 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 283 (2004).
42. See Dalury v. S-K-I, Ltd., 670 A.2d 795, 798 (Vt. 1995) (“Numerous courts have
adopted and applied the Tunkl factors.”).
43. 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963).
44. Id. at 444–46 (footnotes omitted).
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contract, (2) enforce the remainder of the contract without the exculpatory
clause, or (3) limit the application of the exculpatory clause to avoid the
undesirable result.45 In the context of a negligence action, finding an
exculpatory clause to be unconscionable or contrary to public policy would
mean that the plaintiff would not be contractually barred from pursuing her
underlying claim.
B. Liquidated Damages Clauses and the Penalty Test
Liquidated damages clauses, which specify an agreed amount of damages
for a breach of contract, are subject to strict judicial scrutiny.46 In contrast
to exculpatory clauses, the validity of a liquidated damages clause depends
on (1) whether the specified amount is a reasonable estimate of anticipated
or actual damages from a breach and (2) whether such damages would be
difficult to prove.47 A provision that fails to satisfy both criteria is deemed
an unenforceable penalty,48 which is why this is known as the “penalty
rule” or the “penalty test.”
The two prongs of this test are closely related in that the reasonableness
of the fixed damages is proportional to the difficulty of proving actual loss
or establishing the amount of actual loss with certainty.49 “If the difficulty
of proof of loss is great, considerable latitude is allowed in the
approximation of anticipated or actual harm. If, on the other hand, the
difficulty of proof of loss is slight, less latitude is allowed in that
approximation.”50
While parties are free to fix reasonable damages by contract when actual
damages would be difficult to estimate or prove, parties are not free to
provide penalties for breach.51 This is because contract remedies are
intended to be compensatory, not punitive.52 A liquidated damages clause
violates public policy and is termed a “penalty” when it has the intended or
actual effect of punishing a party for breaching a contract.53 Essentially, a
liquidated damages clause must not create such a large disparity between
the negotiated damages and the actual damages likely to be caused by a
breach that it acts in terrorem to induce performance by making a breach

45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
46. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 10, at 554 (“For more than five centuries, strict
judicial scrutiny has been applied to contractual provisions which specify an agreed amount
of damages upon breach of a base obligation.”).
47. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356.
48. See 24 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 65:1 (4th ed. 2002).
49. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 cmt. b.
50. Id.
51. See id. § 356 cmt. a.
52. Id.; see Fritz, supra note 8, at 197–98 (“[A] court will enforce an agreement for the
payment of a stipulated sum, whether it is denominated liquidated damages or penalty, only
where the court finds that the parties in fact intended its payment as compensation for the
anticipated breach, having due regard for the principles of compensation as worked out by
the courts.”).
53. See 24 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 48, § 65:1.
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unreasonably costly.54 Once designated a penalty, a clause that attempts to
liquidate damages “will not be enforced despite the expressed intention of
the parties.”55 In theory, the penalty rule protects against both the unfair
recovery by the nonbreaching party in the event of breach, as well as the
inefficient performance of a contract by the other party when it would
otherwise be economically efficient to breach.56
Liquidated damages clauses can be overcompensatory or
undercompensatory.57 The typical liquidated damages case involves
overcompensatory damages, which are damages greater than those
traditionally available under contract law.58 In such a case, “it is the
breaching party who attacks the enforceability of the liquidated damages
clause.”59 However, in an undercompensatory liquidated damages case, the
damages an aggrieved party can prove under traditional contract law exceed
the liquidated damages.60 In contrast to the typical case, then, these
“underliquidated” damages become “the breaching party’s shield from
provable damages rather than the aggrieved party’s sword for enhanced
damages. The judge must decide if the underliquidated damages clause is
the exclusive remedy or if the plaintiff may instead recover actual damages
or specific performance.”61
If enforced, an underliquidated damages clause denies the aggrieved
party its traditional contract remedies and functions effectively as a
If, however, a court rules that an
limitation-of-liability clause.62
underliquidated damages clause is unenforceable, the plaintiff is no longer
contractually prohibited from proving and collecting actual damages.63
C. Limitation-of-Liability Clauses
If unconscionability doctrine and public policy determine the
enforceability of exculpatory clauses, and the penalty test determines the
enforceability of liquidated damages clauses, then what is the proper test to
determine the enforceability of limitation-of-liability clauses? To help
answer this question, Part I.C.1 provides a general overview of limitationof-liability clauses. Then, Part I.C.2 describes the particular limitation-ofliability provisions characteristic of alarm service contracts.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Goetz & Scott, supra note 10, at 576.
See id. at 556.
See Threedy, supra note 8, at 429.
Warren, supra note 8, at 901.
Threedy, supra note 8, at 429.
See Warren, supra note 8, at 901.
Id.
Id. at 902 n.21.
See id. at 906.
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1. Limitations of Liability
Generally, limitation-of-liability clauses are scrutinized under the same
unconscionability or public policy standards as exculpatory clauses.64 This
tends to be true even where, as in the Better Food Markets contract, the
clause is described as a liquidated damages provision.65
One rationale for applying the test for exculpatory clauses rather than the
test for liquidated damages clauses is that, unlike a penalty, a limitation-ofliability clause does not operate in terrorem to induce performance by
making a breach unreasonably costly.66 “[T]o apply literally the concept of
‘penalty’ to test performance of underliquidated damages is patent
nonsense. No underliquidated damages clause will ever penalize the
breaching party.”67
Another rationale for distinguishing limitation-of-liability clauses from
liquidated damages clauses stems from their different evidentiary burdens at
trial. “[T]he purpose of a liquidated damages provision is to obviate the
need for the nonbreaching party to prove actual damages.”68 After
establishing proof of breach, the aggrieved party is entitled to the liquidated
amount without having to establish the exact amount of actual damages.69
Where a limitation of liability is present, though, a plaintiff is required to
prove actual damages as part of her claim.70 In this manner, a limitation of
liability represents a damages ceiling rather than a stipulation of damages.
Furthermore, limitation-of-liability clauses and overcompensatory
liquidated damages may present differing fairness concerns. In some sense,
both might seem “as repugnant” because they both “deny to the promisee
the remedy for nonperformance which the law normally affords him.”71
However, overcompensatory liquidated damages provide an unjustified
gain to a party, while limitation-of-liability clauses burden a party with an
uncompensated loss.72 The latter instance might be justified as merely an
unsavory consequence of a party’s right to contract away its remedies (as
with exculpatory clauses), but there are no “comparable rights lying on the
stricter side of contract” to justify the former, which attempts to exercise
more power than traditionally allowed under contract law.73

64. See 24 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 48, § 65:6.
65. See id. But see infra Part II.B.
66. See 24 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 48, § 65:6.
67. Warren, supra note 8, at 906 n.46.
68. Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C., 2001 UT 20, ¶ 25, 20 P.3d 388, 394.
69. See 24 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 48, § 65:33.
70. See Mary G. Leary, Liability for Security or Burglar Alarm System Failure, 72 AM.
JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 1, 64 (2003); see also Fritz, supra note 8, at 201 n.17 (“A valid
liquidated damages agreement permits recovery without proof of actual loss . . . . An
agreement for limitation of liability does not in terms promise the payment of any sum;
actual damages must be proved in the usual fashion to the amount recoverable within the
limit fixed.”).
71. Fritz, supra note 8, at 220.
72. See id.
73. Ian R. Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 495,
511 n.54 (1962); accord Threedy, supra note 8, at 430 n.13 (“The rationale for this
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2. Limitations of Liability in Alarm Service Contracts
Alarm service contracts commonly contain a limitation-of-liability
clause.74 The contested provision in Nahra v. Honeywell, Inc.,75 provides
an illustrative example:
It is understood and agreed by the parties hereto that Honeywell is
providing a system designed to reduce the risk of loss; that the payments
provided herein are based solely on the value of the services as described
herein and are unrelated to the value of any property located on
Customer’s premises; that Honeywell is not liable for losses which may
occur in cases of malfunction or nonfunction of the system or of the
monitoring, repairing, signaling [sic] handling or dispatching of the
service, even if due to Honeywell’s negligence or failure of performance;
that Honeywell is not an insurer; and that insurance, if any, covering
personal injury and/or property loss or damage on customer’s premises
shall be obtained and or maintained by Customer. Customer understands
that Honeywell offers several levels of protection and services and that the
system described in the Schedule of Service and Protection has been
chosen by Customer after considering and balancing the levels of
protection afforded by various systems and the related costs.
IT IS AGREED THAT IT IS IMPRACTICAL AND EXTREMELY
DIFFICULT TO FIX ACTUAL DAMAGES WHICH MAY ARISE IN
SITUATIONS WHERE THERE MAY BE A FAILURE OF SERVICES
PROVIDED, DUE TO THE UNCERTAIN VALUE OF CUSTOMER’S
PROPERTY OR THE PROPERTY OF OTHERS KEPT ON THE
PROTECTED PREMISES WHICH MAY BE LOST, STOLEN,
DESTROYED, DAMAGED OR OTHERWISE AFFECTED BY
OCCURRENCES WHICH THE SYSTEM OR SERVICE IS DESIGNED
TO DETECT OR AVERT. INABILITY OF CONTRACTOR TO
GUARANTEE POLICE AND FIRE DEPARTMENT RESPONSE
TIME, AND ESTABLISHING A CASUAL [SIC] CONNECTION
BETWEEN THE SYSTEM OR SERVICE PROBLEMS AND
CUSTOMER’S POSSIBLE LOSS. THEREFORE IF ANY LIABILITY
IS IMPOSED ON HONEYWELL, SUCH LIABILITY SHALL BE
LIMITED TO AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO THE ANNUAL SERVICE
CHARGE OR $10,000, WHICHEVER IS LESS. (IF THERE IS NO
ANNUAL SERVICE CHARGE, HONEYWELL’S LIABILITY SHALL
BE LIMITED TO $500.00.) [SIC] THIS SUM SHALL BE PAID AND
RECEIVED EITHER (i) AS LIQUIDATED DAMAGES AND NOT AS
A PENALTY, OR (ii) AS A LIMITATION OF LIABILITY APPROVED
AND AGREED UPON BY THE PARTIES. THE PAYMENT OF THIS
AMOUNT SHALL BE HONEYWELL’S SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE
LIABILITY REGARDLESS OF WHETHER LOSS OR DAMAGE IS
CAUSED BY THE PERFORMANCE OR NONPERFORMANCE OF
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THIS CONTRACT OR BY NEGLIGENCE,
ACTIVE OR OTHERWISE, OF HONEYWELL, ITS EMPLOYEES,

difference is that a party may waive or give up a right but may not contract for more than is
allowable.”).
74. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
75. 892 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Ohio 1995).
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AGENTS OR REPRESENTATIVES. NO SUIT OR ACTION SHALL
BE BROUGHT AGAINST HONEYWELL MORE THAN ONE (1)
YEAR AFTER THE ACCRUAL OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION
THEREFOR.76

A few things from this excerpt are worth noting because they are
characteristic of alarm service contracts and central to litigation challenging
their enforceability: (1) it contains a provision that disclaims the alarm
company’s liability for losses caused by its own negligence and failure of
performance, (2) it notes that the alarm company “is not an insurer,” (3) it
states that actual damages are impractical and extremely difficult to fix, and
(4) it provides for a fixed limit to the alarm company’s liability “as
liquidated damages and not as a penalty” or “as a limitation of liability.”77
One aspect of the Nahra contract that varies from case to case is the
amount of damages specified as a limit. In Nahra, this amount is the lesser
of the annual service charge or $10,000 (or $500 in the absence of an
annual service charge).78 The lesser of the two amounts in Nahra was the
annual service charge, which totaled $2,124.79 In contrast, the amount
specified in the Better Food Markets contract was $50, an amount unrelated
to the cost of the service.80 While the amount varies between contracts,
alarm service limitation-of-liability clauses typically provide for damages in
one of four ways: (1) a specific dollar amount;81 (2) the cost of service or a
specific dollar amount, whichever is lesser;82 (3) the cost of service or a
specific dollar amount, whichever is greater;83 or (4) the cost of service.84

76. Id. at 964–65 (alterations in original).
77. See id.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 964 (“Plaintiffs agreed to pay a $177 monthly service fee.”).
80. See Better Food Mkts. v. Am. Dist. Tel. Co., 253 P.2d 10, 13 (Cal. 1953).
81. See Donegal Mut. Ins. v. Tri-Plex Sec. Alarm Sys., 622 A.2d 1086, 1088 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1992) ($250); Bargaintown of D.C., Inc. v. Fed. Eng’g Co. of Wash., D.C., 309
A.2d 56, 56–57 (D.C. 1973) ($25); Samson Sales, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 465 N.E.2d 392,
393 (Ohio 1984) ($50); Arthur’s Garage, Inc. v. Racal-Chubb Sec. Sys., Inc., 997 S.W.2d
803, 809 (Tex. App. 1999) ($350).
82. See Gen. Bargain Ctr. v. Am. Alarm Co., 430 N.E.2d 407, 408 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982)
(“$250, or an amount equal to six monthly payments of $46.30 each, whichever [is] the
lesser.”); Schrier v. Beltway Alarm Co., 533 A.2d 1316, 1318 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987)
(providing for six monthly payments of $49.50 per month or $250.00, “whichever is the
lesser”); Morgan Co. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 246 N.W.2d 443, 447 (Minn. 1976)
(“[S]ix (6) times the total monthly charge shown herein [of $82 per month], or . . . [$250.00],
whichever sum shall be less.”); Sanif, Inc. v. Iannotti, 500 N.Y.S.2d 798, 799 (App. Div.
1986) (providing for 10 percent of the $180 installation price or $250.00, “whichever is
lesser”).
83. See Braden v. Honeywell, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 2d 724, 726 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (“[S]ix (6)
times the [$150] monthly charge . . . or $250 whichever is greater.”); Tessler & Son, Inc. v.
Sonitrol Sec. Sys. of N. N.J., Inc., 497 A.2d 530, 532 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985)
(“[T]en percent of the [$600] annual monitoring charge for the premises or $250 whichever
is greater.”).
84. See Cent. Alarm of Tucson v. Ganem, 567 P.2d 1203, 1206 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977)
(“[A] sum equal in amount to the [$43 per month] rental service charged hereunder for a
period of service not to exceed six months.”); Wedner v. Fid. Sec. Sys., Inc., 307 A.2d 429,
430–31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973) (“[T]he yearly service charge [of $312].”).
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One explanation for the peculiarity of the damages specified by these
provisions may lie in the ongoing nature of alarm service contracts. In
contrast to service contracts that are one-shot deals, contracts that provide a
full refund in the event that an alarm service company fails to provide its
service, which would at least protect a customer’s restitution interest,85 may
leave a customer better off than her precontract position. For example,
assume that a store equipped with an alarm experienced five burglaries in
one year. If the alarm service company negligently failed to call the police
during only one of those burglaries but must nevertheless pay restitution for
the cost of the full year’s service, then the store will have benefitted—free
of charge—from the alarm company’s protection during the four other
burglaries.
As with exculpatory clauses86 and liquidated damages clauses,87 if a
court finds a limitation-of-liability clause unenforceable, the plaintiff is no
longer contractually prohibited from seeking actual damages for her
underlying claim.88 When an alarm company negligently fails to provide
its service, plaintiffs often allege both negligence and breach of contract
simultaneously.89
II. DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO DETERMINE THE ENFORCEABILITY
OF LIMITATION-OF-LIABILITY CLAUSES
There is a certain “schizophrenic quality of the law” when it comes to
determining the enforceability of underliquidated damages clauses,90 and
this is no less true when it comes to the enforceability of limitation-ofliability clauses in alarm service contracts. Most states determine the
enforceability of limitation-of-liability clauses in home and business
monitoring service contracts by using the same unconscionability and
public policy analysis used for exculpatory clauses, but some state courts
analyze these provisions as they would liquidated damages clauses.
Meanwhile, some courts have yet to take a definitive stance regarding
whether they will follow the majority or minority rule.
Part II.A addresses the approach taken by a majority of courts, which
analyzes limitation-of-liability clauses as exculpatory clauses for
enforceability purposes. Next, Part II.B describes the minority approach of
applying the penalty test to determine the enforceability of limitation-of85. See Restitution, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (describing restitution as
a remedy “in which the measure of recovery is usu[ally] based not on the plaintiff’s loss, but
on the defendant’s gain”).
86. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
88. See Wyer v. Sonitrol Sec. Sys. of Hartford, Inc., 738 A.2d 1179, 1183 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1999) (finding a limitation-of-liability clause unenforceable, thereby allowing the
plaintiffs to proceed past summary judgment with their claim).
89. See id. at 1180 (“This action has been brought in two counts. Count one is in
negligence, and count two is in breach of contract.”); see also Braden v. Honeywell, Inc., 8
F. Supp. 2d 724, 724 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (“Plaintiffs . . . bring this diversity action asserting
claims of breach of contract and negligence against defendant Honeywell, Inc.”).
90. Threedy, supra note 8, at 453.
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liability clauses. Then, Part II.C discusses several jurisdictions where the
rule is uncertain, either because courts apply both tests or because state
supreme or appellate-level courts have yet to issue a definitive ruling. In
particular, this section discusses the uncertainty in Connecticut, where state
appellate-level courts have not issued a decision interpreting the validity of
limitation-of-liability provisions in alarm service contracts.91
A. The Majority Rule: Limitation-of-Liability Clauses
Are Enforceable Unless Unconscionable
or Against Public Policy
Of the states that have addressed the issue, a majority determine the
enforceability of limitation-of-liability clauses that place a cap on
recoverable damages from one party’s negligence by analyzing whether
such clauses are unconscionable or void as a matter of public policy.92 For
example, in Morgan Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co.,93 the
Supreme Court of Minnesota upheld a provision in a burglar alarm system
contract that limited an alarm seller’s liability for losses caused by the
negligence of its employees to $250 because the provision was not
unconscionable nor did it violate public policy.94 There, the Minnesota
court refused to analyze the provision as it would a liquidated damages
clause despite the use of the words “liquidated damages” in the contract.95
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts distinguishes limitation-ofliability clauses like the clause in Morgan from traditional liquidated
damages clauses because the former attempt to fix unreasonably small,

91. See Forster v. Advanced Elec. Servs., Inc., No. X03CV010510854S, 2002 WL
31463511, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 2002).
92. See Fox Alarm Co. v. Wadsworth, 913 So. 2d 1070 (Ala. 2005); Cent. Alarm of
Tucson v. Ganem, 567 P.2d 1203 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. of Pittsburgh
v. Guardtronic, Inc., 64 S.W.3d 779 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002); Donegal Mut. Ins. v. Tri-Plex Sec.
Alarm Sys., 622 A.2d 1086 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992); L. Luria & Son, Inc. ex rel. Fireman’s
Fund Ins. v. Alarmtec Int’l Corp., 384 So. 2d 947 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Steiner Corp. v.
Am. Dist. Tel., 683 P.2d 435 (Idaho 1984); Purolator Sec., Inc. v. Wells Fargo Alarm Serv.,
491 N.E.2d 161 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); Corral v. Rollins Protective Servs. Co., 732 P.2d 1260
(Kan. 1987); United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 241 S.W.3d 335 (Ky. Ct.
App. 2006); Lazybug Shops, Inc. v. Am. Dist. Tel. Co., 374 So. 2d 183 (La. Ct. App. 1979);
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. v. Guardian Alarm Co. of Mich., 320 N.W.2d 244 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1982); Morgan Co. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 246 N.W.2d 443 (Minn. 1976);
Purcell Tire & Rubber Co. v. Exec. Beechcraft, Inc., 59 S.W.3d 505 (Mo. 2001); New Light
Co. v. Wells Fargo Alarm Servs., 525 N.W.2d 25 (Neb. 1994); Tessler & Son, Inc. v.
Sonitrol Sec. Sys. of N. N.J., Inc., 497 A.2d 530 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985); Florence
v. Merchs. Cent. Alarm Co., 412 N.E.2d 1317 (N.Y. 1980); Reed’s Jewelers, Inc. v. ADT
Co., 260 S.E.2d 107 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979); Fretwell v. Prot. Alarm Co., 764 P.2d 149 (Okla.
1988); Wedner v. Fid. Sec. Sys., Inc., 307 A.2d 429 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973); Ostalkiewicz v.
Guardian Alarm, 520 A.2d 563 (R.I. 1987); Underwood v. Nat’l Alarm Servs., Inc., No.
E2006-00107-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 1412040 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 2007); Arthur’s
Garage, Inc. v. Racal-Chubb Sec. Sys., Inc., 997 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. App. 1999); Jennings v.
Brinks Home Sec., Inc., No. 22957-9-II, 1999 WL 615058 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 1999).
93. 246 N.W.2d 443 (Minn. 1976).
94. Id. at 448.
95. See id.
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rather than unreasonably large, damages.96 Instead of applying the twoprong test to determine whether such a clause is a penalty,97 the
Restatement provides that unconscionability doctrine governs the clause’s
enforceability.98 Some states expressly follow this approach. For example,
in Purcell Tire & Rubber Co. v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc.,99 the Supreme
Court of Missouri adopted the Restatement’s approach by holding that a
clause fixing disproportionately large damages may be a penalty but that a
clause fixing disproportionately small damages is subject to
unconscionability analysis.100
Some courts, in addition to looking for the presence of procedural and
substantive unconscionability, place great weight on policy considerations
when determining whether a limitation-of-liability clause is enforceable.101
Commonly cited policy factors include (1) the effect on prices of holding a
party liable for damages greater than the contracted amount, (2) the
uncertainty of liability exposure, and (3) the ability of one party to be in a
better position than the other to purchase liability insurance.102 An
additional policy consideration provided by courts is whether the parties
consciously allocated the risk of burglary to the customer rather than to the
alarm service company.103
Overall, the general trend in most courts has been to interpret limitationof-liability clauses in alarm service contracts in the same manner as
exculpatory clauses, rather than liquidated damages clauses, and find that
such clauses are not unconscionable or contrary to public policy.104
B. The Minority Rule: Limitation-of-Liability Clauses
Are Enforceable Unless Void as Penalties
A minority of states, however, determine the validity of limitation-ofliability clauses using the penalty test—the same analysis used to determine
whether liquidated damages clauses are unenforceable penalties. Among
these states are Ohio and California. The controlling case in Ohio is
96. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“A
term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is unenforceable on grounds of public
policy as a penalty.”), with id. § 356 cmt. a (“A term that fixes an unreasonably small
amount as damages may be unenforceable as unconscionable.”).
97. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
98. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 cmt. d. The U.C.C. adopts a
similar approach, providing that limitations of liability that fail to provide “at least a fair
quantum of remedy for breach” are subject to deletion as unconscionable. U.C.C. § 2-719
cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014).
99. 59 S.W.3d 505 (Mo. 2001).
100. See id. at 510.
101. See Arthur’s Garage, Inc. v. Racal-Chubb Sec. Sys., Inc., 997 S.W.2d 803, 810–11
(Tex. App. 1999) (ruling that policy reasons favored upholding a limitation-of-liability
clause in an alarm service contract).
102. See id.
103. See Fireman’s Fund Am. Ins. v. Burns Elec. Sec. Servs., Inc., 417 N.E.2d 131, 133
(Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
104. See Gen. Bargain Ctr. v. Am. Alarm Co., 430 N.E.2d 407, 411 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982)
(citing twelve jurisdictions that have upheld limitation-of-liability clauses in alarm service
contracts).
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Samson Sales, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc.,105 in which the Supreme Court of
Ohio held that a limitation-of-liability clause, which limited an alarm
company’s liability for damages caused by its negligence to $50, was an
unenforceable penalty because the limitation was disproportionate to
reasonably foreseeable damages and because damages were readily
ascertainable.106 In doing so, the court applied the same test it uses to
determine the enforceability of liquidated damages clauses.107
The controlling case in California is Better Food Markets, in which a
limitation-of-liability clause was upheld because it was a “reasonable
endeavor by the parties to estimate a fair average compensation for any loss
that may be sustained.”108 There, the California Supreme Court treated a
provision that limited an alarm company’s liability for damages caused by
negligence to $50 as a liquidated damages provision.109 Unlike the Ohio
court in Samson Sales, however, the California court emphasized the
impracticality or extreme difficulty of estimating damages at the time of
contracting and opined that the greater the difficulty in estimating damages,
the greater the range of estimates a court should uphold as reasonable.110
It is not unusual that the Samson Sales court refused to enforce the
underliquidated damages clause while the Better Food Markets court
upheld a nearly identical provision. Courts applying the penalty test to
underliquidated damages clauses generate unpredictable results, and the
outcomes of these cases do not seem to vary, as one might think they
would, based on the disproportion between the liquidated damages and the
actual damages.111
One rationale for applying a liquidated damages analysis to determine the
enforceability of limitation-of-liability clauses in alarm service contracts—a
rationale that favors finding such clauses unenforceable—was summarized
well by Judge William F. Cercone, who dissented in Wedner v. Fidelity
Security Systems, Inc.112:
If the parties can escape their contractual provisions for liquidated
damages because the amount stated is unreasonably disproportionate
(either higher or lower) to the actual damages involved, there is no logical
reason why the same test of reasonableness should not apply to a
contractual limitation of liability. I would hold therefore, that a
105. 465 N.E.2d 392 (Ohio 1984).
106. Id. at 394. In addition to requiring that damages be “uncertain as to amount and
difficult [to] pro[ve]” for such a contract to be enforceable, the Ohio court also specified that
the contract as a whole must not be manifestly unconscionable and that it must be the clear
intention of the parties that damages would be limited to the expressed amount in the event
of a party’s negligence. Id. (quoting Jones v. Stevens, 146 N.E. 894, 895 (Ohio 1925)).
107. See id. at 393–94.
108. Better Food Mkts. v. Am. Dist. Tel. Co., 253 P.2d 10, 15 (Cal. 1953). Contra id. at
17 (Carter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he $50 provision bears no reasonable relation to any amount
which might have been lost by a failure of the system to operate.”).
109. Id. at 13–16 (majority opinion).
110. Id. at 14–15.
111. See Warren, supra note 8, at 908–09 (describing eleven cases in which
underliquidated damages were enforced or not enforced without any discernable pattern).
112. 307 A.2d 429 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973).

2016]

LIABILITY IN ALARM SERVICE CONTRACTS

829

contractual limitation, as well as a contractual liquidation of damages, is
not binding where unreasonable and bearing no relation to the loss that
would result from defendant’s failure to fulfill the terms of its contract.
The limitation in this case “to a sum equal in amount to the yearly service
charge hereunder” was clearly unreasonable and arbitrary, bearing no
relationship whatever to the damages flowing from defendant’s breach.
In my opinion this provision, whether viewed as one of liquidated
damages or as a limitation of damages, should not be enforced.113

However, it is likely that courts apply a liquidated damages analysis to
these provisions for a simpler reason. Recall that alarm service contracts
often refer to their limitation-of-liability clauses as “liquidated damages.”114
It may be that some courts treat limitation-of-liability clauses as liquidated
damages clauses solely because contracts designate them as such.115
C. Uncertain Jurisdictions: A Look at Connecticut
Some jurisdictions have yet to adopt a definitive test for how they
enforce limitation-of-liability clauses in alarm service contracts. At least
one jurisdiction—the District of Columbia—applies a liquidated damages
analysis as well as an unconscionability analysis when determining the
enforceability of these clauses.116 As mentioned above, a Connecticut
appellate-level court has yet to decide the matter.117 Connecticut trial-level
courts appear to adopt the minority rule of interpreting such provisions as
liquidated damages clauses. Federal courts applying Connecticut law,
however, have viewed identical provisions as exculpatory clauses and
applied the unconscionability and public policy test adopted by the majority
of state courts.
1. Federal Application of Connecticut Law
In Leon’s Bakery, Inc. v. Grinnell Corp.,118 the Second Circuit, applying
Connecticut law, addressed the enforceability of a limitation-of-liability
clause in a fire alarm system contract.119 The court recognized that the
Connecticut Supreme Court had not addressed the issue yet, so it looked to
the law of other jurisdictions to determine that the clause was enforceable
because it was not unconscionable.120 The court also noted policy reasons
to uphold the provision, observing that premises owners are in a better
position to buy appropriate insurance for the property and that “limitations
113. Id. at 433 (Cercone, J., dissenting).
114. See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text; see also Samson Sales, Inc. v.
Honeywell, Inc., 465 N.E.2d 392, 393 (Ohio 1984); Wedner, 307 A.2d at 430–31.
115. See Warren, supra note 8, at 903–04 (arguing that courts engage in “sheer label
application” by applying the penalty rule to underliquidated damages simply because
litigants call these clauses “liquidated damages”).
116. See Bargaintown of D.C., Inc. v. Fed. Eng’g Co. of Wash., D.C., 309 A.2d 56, 57
(D.C. 1973) (ruling that an alarm service contract was enforceable under both tests).
117. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
118. 990 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1993).
119. Id. at 47–50.
120. Id. at 47–49.
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on liability help keep alarm services affordable.”121 Subsequently, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Connecticut has followed Leon’s Bakery’s
ruling on the enforceability of limitation-of-liability clauses in alarm system
contracts, placing additional emphasis on the policy reasons for upholding
these types of provisions.122
2. Connecticut Trial-Level Court Decisions
Since Leon’s Bakery, Connecticut still has not issued any appellate-level
rulings regarding whether limitation-of-liability clauses in alarm service
contracts are interpreted as exculpatory clauses or liquidated damages
clauses.123 Connecticut trial-level courts (the Connecticut Superior Courts)
have weighed in on the issue, though.124 So far, Connecticut Superior
Courts have viewed these limitations of liability as liquidated damages
clauses and have applied a three-prong test to determine their
enforceability, considering whether (1) the damages are uncertain or
difficult to prove, (2) the parties intended to liquidate damages in advance,
and (3) the amount is “reasonable because it is not greatly disproportionate
to the amount of damages which the parties assumed at the time of their
contract would be sustained if the contract were breached.”125 This test has
been applied with mixed results.126
The reason why some limitation-of-liability clauses are enforceable under
this test and why others are not has less to do with differences in the
drafting of the contracts and more to do with how courts apply the first and
third prongs of the test. For example, in Forster v. Advanced Electronic
Services, Inc.,127 the Superior Court of Connecticut held that a contract
satisfied the first prong of the test (whether damages are uncertain or
difficult to prove) because “[t]he defendant is not a property insurer and
cannot be expected to know the value of a customer’s home and
belongings.”128 The Forster Court also found that the third prong (whether
121. Id. at 49 (quoting Sommer v. Fed. Signal Corp., 593 N.E.2d 1365, 1370 (N.Y.
1992)).
122. See Omni Corp. v. Sonitrol Corp., 476 F. Supp. 2d 125, 129 (D. Conn. 2007).
123. At least one case acknowledged this uncertainty. See Mattegat v. Klopfenstein, 717
A.2d 276, 280 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998) (“It is unclear whether . . . the parties’ contract is a
liquidated damages clause or a disclaimer of liability clause.”). However, the clause at issue
was found to be neither an enforceable liquidated damages clause nor an enforceable
exculpatory clause. Id. It is still uncertain, then, how a Connecticut court will rule if a
limitation-of-liability clause passes one test but fails the other.
124. See Forster v. Advanced Elec. Servs., Inc., No. X03CV010510854S, 2002 WL
31463511 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 2002); Wyer v. Sonitrol Sec. Sys. of Hartford, Inc., 738
A.2d 1179 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999); Hartford Ins. v. ADT Sec. Sys., Inc., No. CV
980357149, 1999 WL 259688 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 22, 1999).
125. Wyer, 738 A.2d at 1182–83; accord Forster, 2002 WL 31463511, at *4; Hartford
Ins., 1999 WL 259688, at *1.
126. Compare Forster, 2002 WL 31463511, at *4–5 (upholding a limitation-of-liability
clause in an alarm service contract), and Hartford Ins., 1999 WL 259688, at *2 (same), with
Wyer, 738 A.2d at 1183 (finding a limitation-of-liability clause in an alarm service contract
to be an unenforceable penalty).
127. No. X03CV010510854S, 2002 WL 31463511 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 2002).
128. Id. at *4.
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the stipulated amount was greatly disproportionate to the amount of
presumable loss from a breach of contract) was satisfied because “the
[contract] price does not generally include a sum designed to anticipate the
possible need to pay the purchaser the value of the property that the system
is to protect.”129
In contrast, the Superior Court of Connecticut held that a contract did not
satisfy these two factors in Wyer v. Sonitrol Security Systems of Hartford,
Inc.130 under very similar circumstances. Regarding the first prong, the
Wyer Court found that the value of the lost property was readily
ascertainable and that an inventory of the property could have been
conducted at the time of contracting.131 Under the third prong, the actual
damages ($6,800) were found to be greatly disproportionate to the
liquidated damages ($198.44).132
As the conflicting federal and state rulings in Connecticut illustrate, the
test to determine the enforceability of limitation-of-liability clauses in alarm
service contracts, as well as the enforceability of the clauses themselves, is
not settled law in all jurisdictions. Furthermore, jurisdictions like the
District of Columbia that apply both tests may eventually encounter a case
where a provision passes one test but fails the other,133 forcing a decision as
to which test actually is controlling.
III. AN OPPORTUNITY TO CRAFT A BETTER RULE
The uncertainty in some states provides an opportunity to address which
rule courts should apply and, more generally, whether limitation-of-liability
clauses in alarm service contracts should be enforced when an alarm service
provider negligently fails to provide its bargained-for services. This part
discusses the benefits of choosing one rule over the other by analyzing the
implications each rule has for consumers, insurance companies, and the
courts. Part III.A argues that limitation-of-liability clauses in alarm service
contracts would be unenforceable penalties in jurisdictions that analyze
such provisions as liquidated damages clauses. It also argues that adopting
this rule would create perverse incentives for alarm service companies to
redraft their contracts. Part III.B questions the conventional policy rationale
provided by many courts for allowing alarm service providers to disclaim
liability for negligence in limitation-of-liability clauses. Finally, Part III.C
proposes adopting the majority rule of analyzing limitation-of-liability
clauses as exculpatory clauses and contends that certain limitation-ofliability clauses in alarm service contracts should be void as a matter of
public policy.

129.
1993)).
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at *5 (quoting Leon’s Bakery, Inc. v. Grinnell Corp., 990 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir.
738 A.2d 1179 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999).
Id. at 1183.
Id.
See infra Part III.A.
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A. Perverse Incentives from Applying the Penalty Test
As an initial matter, it is worth noting that if limitation-of-liability
clauses like the provision in Better Food Markets are interpreted as
liquidated damages clauses, they should not pass the penalty test. This is
primarily because, while the amount of damages might be difficult to
estimate at the time of contracting, there is no reason to believe that
damages flowing from an alarm service provider’s negligence would be
difficult for the nonbreaching party to prove.134 In fact, property losses
from theft, fire, or water damage are relatively simple to quantify.135 These
types of losses stand in contrast to damages that are more difficult to
calculate, such as revenue losses from breaches of nondisclosure or
nonsolicitation agreements.136
Moreover, the stipulated damages in alarm service contracts do not
purport to be a reasonable estimate of anticipated or actual loss caused by a
breach but instead fix an arbitrary amount, such as $50.137 As it is not
difficult to prove damages, courts should give very little deference to this
fixed amount.138 Additionally, it can hardly be said that this amount is
designed to compensate the nonbreaching party for the other party’s failure
to perform.139
From this analysis, it appears that cases such as Samson Sales and Wyer
correctly held that, when interpreted as liquidated damages clauses,
limitation-of-liability clauses in alarm service contracts are not enforceable
when they limit a service provider’s liability to an unreasonably small
amount for damages caused by the provider’s own negligence. This reflects
the general attitude that a plain underestimate of the probable loss from
nonperformance of a contract is just as bad as an overestimate.140 To
consumers of alarm services, refusing to enforce underliquidated damages
clauses might seem like a good policy. After all, if a plaintiff can prove that
134. See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text.
135. See Samson Sales, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 465 N.E.2d 392, 394 (Ohio 1984)
(finding damages from the breach of an alarm service contract to be “as readily ascertainable
as the damages in a multitude of other conceivable situations involving negligence and/or
breach of contract”). But see Forster v. Advanced Elec. Servs., Inc., No.
X03CV010510854S, 2002 WL 31463511, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 2002) (finding
that the amount of fire damage that was specifically attributable to an alarm system’s failure
would be difficult to ascertain).
136. See Overholt Crop Ins. Serv. v. Travis, 941 F.2d 1361, 1370 (8th Cir. 1991)
(enforcing a liquidated damages clause because damages from breaches of nondisclosure and
nonsolicitation agreements are difficult to calculate).
137. See Better Food Mkts. v. Am. Dist. Tel. Co., 253 P.2d 10, 18 (Cal. 1953) (Carter, J.,
dissenting) (“The characteristic feature of a penalty is that it bears no relation to the actual
damage which may be caused by a breach, but is arbitrarily fixed without any attempt to
estimate the amount of injury.”). Justice Jesse W. Carter, dissenting in Better Food Markets,
suggested that the average amount of cash and inventory left in the store overnight would
have been a reasonable estimate of damages. Id. at 17.
138. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
139. See generally JKC Holding Co. v. Wash. Sports Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 468
(4th Cir. 2001) (stating that liquidated damages clauses are “based on the principle of just
compensation”); 24 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 48, § 65:1.
140. See Fritz, supra note 8, at 202, 213–14.
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an alarm company’s failure to perform its contractual duty was the
proximate cause of property loss from a burglary or fire, why should she be
limited to recovering such a seemingly small, arbitrarily determined amount
of damages?
At first glance, home and business owners might think that the Ohio
Supreme Court’s approach in Samson Sales and the Connecticut Superior
Court’s approach in Wyer—interpreting limitation-of-liability clauses as
liquidated damages clauses—provides them with protection against
unreasonable limitations of liability. However, alarm service consumers
might be worse off under such an approach because alarm service providers
might respond by redrafting their contracts to eliminate the fixed damage
amount and completely disclaim liability altogether. By doing so, the
limitation-of-liability clause would become an exculpatory clause instead.
Generally, exculpatory clauses are enforceable unless they are
unconscionable or contravene public policy.141 Exculpatory clauses that
relieve a party from its own negligence, while disfavored, are upheld if
expressed unambiguously and assented to by both contracting parties.142
As this test focuses on different criteria than the penalty test does, a contract
could potentially pass one test but fail the other. An unenforceable
limitation-of-liability clause, stripped of its liquidated damages, could thus
become an enforceable exculpatory clause.143
Consider, then, the ironic consequence of redrafting a contract to avoid a
penalty test analysis: a previously unenforceable provision limiting
damages to $1,000 may suddenly become enforceable when the amount is
changed to $0. This perverse result reveals an inconsistency in jurisdictions
that apply the penalty test to underliquidated damages but an
unconscionability test to exculpatory clauses: if the law allows a party to
assume the entirety of risk with no remedy whatsoever (as one does by
agreeing to an exculpatory clause), there is no reason to deny a party the
ability to assume a part of that risk instead (as one does by agreeing to a
limitation-of-liability clause).144
Accordingly, treating limitation-of-liability clauses as liquidated damages
clauses would create an incentive for alarm service providers to eliminate
fixed damages provisions from their service contracts and replace them with
complete disclaimers of liability for negligence. If these complete
disclaimers are enforceable, then alarm service consumers would be worse
141. See supra Part I.A.
142. B & D Assocs., Inc. v. Russell, 807 A.2d 1001, 1005–06 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002);
Mattegat v. Klopfenstein, 717 A.2d 276, 280 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998).
143. Compare Nahra v. Honeywell, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 962, 967 n.2 (N.D. Ohio 1995)
(opining that an alarm service provider could “exculpate itself from all liability in an
appropriately drafted contract”), with Samson Sales, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 465 N.E.2d
392, 394 (Ohio 1984) (ruling that limiting liability to $50 constitutes an unenforceable
penalty). But see Braden v. Honeywell, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 2d 724, 728–29 (S.D. Ohio 1998)
(“[I]t is inconceivable that the Ohio Supreme Court would have refused enforcement of a
clause limiting damages to $50.00 while at the same time would have enforced a clause
preventing any liability under the same contract.”).
144. See 11 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 58.16 (rev. ed. 2005).
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off. After all, recovering an unreasonably small amount of damages from a
service provider’s negligence is better than being barred from seeking any
damages whatsoever. Furthermore, reducing the cost of an alarm service
provider’s negligence is unlikely to encourage providers to take more care
in installing and monitoring their systems.145 This may result in a decrease
in the quality of alarm systems.146 Not only would alarm service
consumers be worse off, but society would also receive a reduced benefit
from any positive externalities that alarm services generate.147
The real issue then becomes whether these redrafted contracts that
disclaim all liability for negligence would be enforceable, which depends
on whether their exculpatory clauses are unconscionable or contrary to
public policy.148 Thus, applying the penalty test to limitation-of-liability
provisions merely postpones the eventual determination of whether
disclaimers of liability in alarm service contracts are unconscionable or
against public policy. The underliquidated damages in cases like Better
Food Markets were so unreasonably small in comparison to the actual
losses that they were essentially token payments.149 As a “mere token
payment is as objectionable as eliminating it altogether,”150 a jurisdiction
might as well face the inevitable and determine whether limitation-ofliability clauses in alarm service contracts are unconscionable or against
public policy.
Applying the penalty test to limitation-of-liability clauses in alarm
service contracts may result in a short-lived victory for consumers.
However, it might make consumers, insurers, and society worse off in the
long run when alarm companies redraft their contracts to avoid the penalty
test—unless, that is, the jurisdiction has ruled that complete disclaimers of
liability for an alarm company’s negligence are unconscionable or against
public policy.
B. Questioning the Conventional Policy Wisdom
Having determined that analyzing the enforceability of limitation-ofliability clauses in alarm service contracts using the penalty test may not be
the best approach,151 the unconscionability and public policy analysis used
to determine the enforceability of exculpatory clauses appears to be the
obvious alternative. Under this analysis, courts generally find that such
clauses are not unconscionable or against public policy.152 However, there
is reason to believe that the typical policy reasons for enforcing such
clauses are misguided. An alarm company trade association’s website
145. See infra Part III.B.1.
146. See infra Part III.B.1.
147. See generally Bruce L. Benson & Brent D. Mast, Privately Produced General
Deterrence, 44 J.L. & ECON. 725, 729–31 (2001).
148. See supra Part I.A.
149. Recall that in Better Food Markets, liquidated damages were $50 while actual
damages were over $35,000. See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text.
150. Fritz, supra note 8, at 210.
151. See supra Part III.A.
152. 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 69 (2004).
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provides an illustrative example. It asks the question “Why Won’t You be
Responsible for Your Own Negligence?” and answers with the following:
This question is posed thousands of times a year to security companies.
The answer is that the security company is not the cause of the loss. The
burglar, robber, rapist, arsonist or other negligent party is the direct cause
of the loss. Security companies can do no more than detect. The process
of detection is not perfect. THERE WILL BE FAILURES, human or
otherwise. The allocation of the cost of that risk to the security company
would endanger the viability of the industry by creating exposures vastly
disproportionate to the income derived.153

This answer reflects several commonly proffered arguments for enforcing
limitations of liability in alarm service contracts: (1) that alarm companies
are not the best insurers of their own failures and that holding otherwise
would endanger the industry; (2) that the risk of burglary or fire is allocated
to the customer, not the alarm company; and (3) that alarm companies are
not responsible for losses caused by their own negligence because
intervening tortfeasors are the direct cause of the losses. The following
sections address these issues, respectively.
1. The Better-Insurer Argument
In Leon’s Bakery, the Second Circuit placed significant emphasis on the
idea that premises owners are in a better position to purchase appropriate
insurance for lost or damaged property.154 Placing such importance on the
availability of insurance for premises owners, though, ignores a few
realities of alarm service contracts. The first is that an individual estimate
of potential losses from burglaries or fires probably would not be overly
burdensome to include in an alarm service contract because the company
needs to visit the premises to install the alarm service in the first place.
This level of individual interaction with the customer gives the alarm
service company an opportunity to gather information about the customer.
Alarm companies could price discriminate based on whether the alarmed
premises is a home or business. Within these categories, alarm companies
could further discriminate based on neighborhood affluence or business
type.
The second reality is that emphasizing the ability of premises owners to
obtain insurance ignores the fact that liability insurance is available for
alarm service providers as well.155 These insurers would presumably raise
153. Limitations of Liability, CENT. STATION ALARM ASS’N INT’L, http://csaaintl.org/
issues/limitations-of-liability/#Why%20Won’t%20You%20be%20Responsible%20for%20
Your%20OOO%20Negligence? (last visited Oct. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/2DUF-K58M].
154. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
155. See
Alarm
Contractors
Business
Insurance,
HARTFORD,
https://
www.thehartford.com/business-insurance/alarm-contractor (last visited Oct. 16, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/2KNH-R42L]; Alarm Contractors Insurance / Installers / Security
Company, ALLRISKS, http://www.allrisks.com/industry-specialties/detail/alarm-companies
(last visited Oct. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/E3WY-CKAV]; BROWNYARD PROGRAMS,
http://www.brownyardprograms.com/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/N4GZWZCN].
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or lower insurance rates for alarm service providers based on the rate at
which their service fails because of the provider’s negligence.
However, the incentive for an alarm service provider to reduce its
negligence rate is not present if the provider is able to exculpate itself from
liability.156 This is because the nature of contract “is optional: a party can
either do a promised thing or pay damages.”157 Accordingly, an alarm
service provider has an incentive to spend only the amount of money that is
“just worth it” to guard against its own negligence.158 Where an alarm
service provider is able to exculpate itself from liability, that amount is
equal to the underliquidated damages provision. This amount is not
“efficient,” though, because the compensation does not mirror the value of
full performance.159 As this Note has discussed at length, the damages
from an alarm company’s negligence often far exceed the underliquidated
damages provision.
Furthermore, alarm service providers are likely the least-cost insurers of
damages from their own negligence in these scenarios because they are in
control of their own negligence rate.160 The cost of insuring against
damages from an alarm company’s negligence would consist of two main
expenses: (1) the expected value of the underwriting loss to the insurer and
(2) transaction costs, such as the cost of determining the probability of
nonperformance and the cost of negotiation and communication with the
insured.161 Here, the alarm company has an advantage over a third-party
insurer. The cost of negotiation and communication with the insured will
be similar for alarm companies and third-party insurers alike, but the alarm

156. See Burnham, supra note 9, at 381 (noting that “exculpation undermines the
deterrent effect of tort liability”). Judge Richard A. Posner criticized this idea in Edwards v.
Honeywell, Inc., 50 F.3d 484 (7th Cir. 1995), where he opined:
Pointing to the $250 limitation of the alarm service’s liability to the
[homeowners], the plaintiff argues that if Honeywell prevails in this suit, alarm
services will have no incentive to take care. But they will. Honeywell lost the
[homeowners’] business. Our society relies more heavily on competition than on
liability to optimize the quality of the goods and services supplied by the private
sector of the economy. A case such as this does Honeywell’s customer relations
no good even if it wins the case . . . .
Id. at 491. However, Judge Posner’s approach, which requires a consumer to “shop around
and perhaps forego the activity, may not adequately protect consumers from exculpatory
clauses in modern business dealings.” Guissinger, supra note 9, at 800. Competition may
not adequately protect consumers from exculpatory clauses because (1) markets might be
monopolistic rather than competitive, (2) inadequate information may be available to
consumers, and (3) boilerplate language only becomes important when something goes
wrong. See id. at 800 n.35 (citing Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd—
Consumers and the Common Law Tradition, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 351 (1970)).
157. Warren, supra note 8, at 915.
158. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 10, at 581.
159. See id. at 558.
160. See id. at 583 (“[T]here are strong economic arguments that suggest that the vendor
is the lowest-cost insurer against non-performance . . . [when] the vendor has some control
over the probability of externally caused non-performance.”).
161. See id. at 579–80.
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company is in a superior position to know the probability that it will
negligently fail to perform its service.162
More importantly, the alarm company is able to exercise some control
over the rate at which it will negligently fail to perform its service.163 Thus,
the alarm company is in a unique position to reduce the expected value of
the underwriting loss by taking steps to reduce its negligence rate.164 The
alarm company would therefore have an incentive to spend resources to
decrease its negligence rate up to the point where it is “just worth it.”165
Hence, even if the alarm company would incur the same transaction costs as
a third-party insurer, the alarm company has an efficiency advantage.166 As
between an alarm service customer, the customer’s third-party insurer, and
an alarm service company, net welfare would increase if alarm companies
were required to insure against their own negligence.
For example, suppose that a customer purchases third-party liability
insurance and an alarm service and pays $2,000 a year for each contract.
Part of the price of the third-party liability insurance is the risk that losses
may occur from the alarm company’s negligence—say, $200 of the contract
price. Now assume the alarm service company is liable for losses caused
by its own negligence. The alarm company will now have an incentive to
reduce its negligence rate and will increase the cost of its service to account
for its increased liability. Supposing the alarm company halved its
negligence rate, the new alarm contract price would be $2,100. However,
the third-party insurer no longer has to insure against the risk of the alarm
company’s negligence, so it would be able to reduce its price to $1,800.
This results in a net welfare increase of $100.
The upshot is that consumers will end up paying less in total for property
insurance and alarm services because alarm companies will take steps to
reduce the rate of their negligence. Not only does this benefit consumers,
but the reduction in burglary and fire losses presumably benefits society as
a whole. Consumers should be willing to pay the higher prices alarm
service companies would have to charge to compensate for their increased
liability because of the lower property insurance prices and increase in the
quality of alarm services. This strongly calls into question the contention
that an increase in liability would make alarm services prohibitively costly.
While courts cite the availability of third-party liability insurance as a
policy reason in support of enforcing limitation-of-liability clauses in alarm
service contracts, a detailed analysis of the party that is actually in the best
position to insure against an alarm company’s negligence reveals that
society as a whole would benefit if alarm companies were liable for their
own negligence. Accordingly, public policy favors finding these clauses
unenforceable.

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

See id. at 580.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 581.
See id. at 582.
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2. The Risk-Allocation Argument
As an additional policy reason to enforce limitation-of-liability clauses in
alarm service contracts, some courts find that these provisions represent the
parties’ decision to consciously allocate the risk of burglary or fire to the
customer rather than to the alarm service company.167 One court noted that
“[f]or the small compensation received obviously [the alarm company]
could not afford to assume responsibilities such as are assumed in the case
of fire insurance coverage.”168 Another court opined that holding an alarm
service company liable for damages caused by its negligence “would in
practical effect excuse the homeowner from having to insure the property
and would shift the risk of its loss to the burglar alarm manufacturer.”169
These fears of requiring alarm service companies to become general
casualty insurers are misplaced. The plaintiffs in the cases cited by this
Note were not contending that alarm service providers should be liable for
all burglaries and fires. Rather, they are simply arguing that alarm service
providers should be liable for losses caused by the alarm company’s own
negligence. Thus, if a burglar breaks into a store and the alarm company
alerts the police according to the terms of its contract, the alarm company
would not be liable simply because the police fail to catch the burglar. The
scenario at issue is where the alarm company negligently fails to alert the
police and the plaintiff can prove that the alarm company’s failure to
perform its contractual duty was the proximate cause of her loss—as was
the case in Better Food Markets.170
Alarm service providers are not being asked to become insurers against
burglaries or fires. They are being asked to become insurers against their
own negligence. As alarm companies are the least-cost insurers of their
own negligence,171 it is in society’s best interest to expect them to bear this
burden.172
3. The Intervening-Tortfeasor Argument
Another policy issue some courts raise when deciding a limitation-ofliability clause’s enforceability is the difficulty in calculating an alarm
company’s portion of liability for losses caused by an intervening

167. See Fireman’s Fund Am. Ins. v. Burns Elec. Sec. Servs., Inc., 417 N.E.2d 131, 133
(Ill. App. Ct. 1980); see also Warren, supra note 8, at 932–33 (describing the perception that
“underliquidated damages provisions were frequently the result of deliberate risk
allocation”).
168. Atkinson v. Pac. Fire Extinguisher Co., 253 P.2d 18, 21 (Cal. 1953).
169. Lobianco v. Prop. Prot., Inc., 437 A.2d 417, 424 (Pa. Super Ct. 1981).
170. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
171. See supra Part III.B.1.
172. Though not desirable, should it nevertheless be permissible for alarm companies to
contract away liability for their own negligence? Part III.C, infra, answers this question in
the negative.
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tortfeasor.173 An intervening tortfeasor is an actor who brings about harm
after another’s negligent act or omission.174 Applied to burglar alarm
service failures, a burglar is an intervening tortfeasor who causes harm after
an alarm company’s negligent failure to call the police. Recall that one
policy justification provided by the alarm service trade association’s
website was that “the security company is not the cause of the loss. The
burglar, robber, rapist, arsonist or other negligent party is the direct cause of
the loss.”175
Despite an intervening tortfeasor being the direct cause of the loss,
another actor’s negligence will create liability if “the actor at the time of his
negligent conduct realized or should have realized the likelihood that such a
situation might be created, and that a third person might avail himself of the
opportunity to commit such a tort or crime.”176 When it comes to an alarm
service company’s negligent failure to provide its service, it is obvious that
the company realized or should have realized the likelihood of losses
caused by a third person’s criminal act, as such crimes were expressly
contemplated during contract formation. Indeed, the court in Central Alarm
of Tucson v. Ganem177 noted that “[i]t is hard to imagine circumstances
more appropriate than those before us, where the only reason for installation
and maintenance of the alarm system was the foreseeability of a possible
burglary attempt.”178 Accordingly, the foreseeability of damages caused by
a burglar if an alarm service negligently fails to provide its contractual
obligations means that alarm companies are still liable even if the burglar is
the direct cause of the loss.179
On close inspection, the public policy arguments typically cited in
support of enforcing limitation-of-liability clauses in alarm service
contracts are unconvincing. While it is true that customers can purchase
third-party liability insurance to cover the risk of alarm companies
negligently failing to provide their services, alarm companies themselves
173. See Warren, supra note 8, at 913 n.80 (“[S]ome courts note the difficulty of
litigating how much the failure of the alarm system increased the loss from fire or
burglary.”).
174. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 441 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
175. Limitations of Liability, supra note 153.
176. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448.
177. 567 P.2d 1203 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977).
178. Id. at 1206 (citations omitted). The Ganem court went on to find that the burglary
“was certainly within the ambit of risk” created by the alarm company’s failure and that, but
for the alarm company’s negligence, “the loss would not have occurred approximately 99
times out of 100, based on the success rate of a properly maintained system.” Id. at 1206.
179. Cf. Monitronics Int’l, Inc. v. Veasley, 746 S.E.2d 793, 801 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013)
(finding that an alarm company was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries when she
was sexually assaulted by an intruder). The precise manner in which liability should be
apportioned is beyond the scope of this Note. However, any difficulty in calculating
damages seems like a slender reed to rest an argument against holding alarm service
providers accountable for damages they proximately caused, especially considering the
willingness of courts to apportion liability—despite intervening tortfeasors—in other areas
of the law. See generally E.L. Kellett, Annotation, Private Person’s Duty and Liability for
Failure to Protect Another Against Criminal Attack by Third Person, 10 A.L.R.3d 619
(1966).
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would be the most efficient insurers of their own negligence. Imposing this
liability on alarm companies would not force companies to assume a
customer’s general casualty risks. Instead, it would incentivize companies
to reduce their negligence rates by forcing them to account for the
consequences of their mistakes. Finally, as the consequences of an alarm
company’s failure to provide its services are foreseeable, such a failure
would be the proximate cause of a customer’s damages even if a burglar or
an unattended stove is the direct cause of the loss.
C. A New Public Policy Approach
While it traditionally has been employed to enforce limitation-of-liability
clauses in alarm service contracts, the unconscionability and public policy
test is still the best approach for courts to adopt because it provides courts
with the flexibility to protect consumers from particularly egregious
limitation-of-liability clauses.
Courts should rule that underliquidated damages clauses in alarm service
contracts that provide nominal damages in gross disproportion to actual
damages are substantively unconscionable. It is commonplace for service
contracts to disclaim consequential damages by limiting liability to the cost
of the service.180 By doing so, even though the customer is denied her
traditional expectancy remedy under contract law, she is at least able to
protect her restitution interest. Alarm service contracts that limit liability to
unreasonably small damages in the event of an alarm company’s negligence
deny the customer her expectancy and restitution interest. Imagine how
this provision would read in any other service contract: “We will charge
you $1,250 for our services. If, through our own failure to exercise
ordinary care, we fail to provide those services, your damages are limited to
$250.” Such a contract seems absurd. Its terms are “so oppressive that no
reasonable person would make them and no fair and honest person would
accept them.”181 In other words, it is substantively unconscionable.
Nevertheless, this is essentially what courts are enforcing when they uphold
limitation-of-liability clauses in alarm service contracts.
Courts should not enforce limitation-of-liability provisions in alarm
service contracts that ignore all remedies under contract law. If a customer
cannot be put in the position she would have been in had the alarm service
company provided its service, she should at least be able to be put in her
precontract position. Otherwise, the alarm company has made the customer
worse off than she was before. However, the continuous relationship
between alarm service providers and customers makes restitution

180. See Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. v. Pest Doctor Sys., Inc., No. 3:14-CV-143, 2015 WL
4945767, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 2015) (“To the fullest extent permitted by law, [the
service company] will not be liable for personal injury, death, property damage, loss of use,
loss of income or any other damages whatsoever, including consequential and incidental
damages, arising from this service. [The service company’s] liability is specifically limited
to the labor and products necessary to [perform the service].”).
181. Burnham, supra note 9, at 384.
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problematic.182 A viable alternative, then, is to protect the customer’s
expectancy interest by refusing to enforce the unconscionable provision and
allowing the customer to proceed with her underlying claim for actual
damages.
On the public policy side, courts would be free to demand that, to be
enforceable, limitation-of-liability clauses must better compensate the
nonbreaching party—especially after recognizing that the traditional policy
rationales for enforcing limitation-of-liability clauses in alarm service
contracts no longer provide sufficient justifications for shifting the burden
of an alarm service provider’s negligence onto the consumer.183 From an
efficiency perspective, social policy dictates that alarm service providers
should not be able to disclaim liability for negligently failing to provide
their services, because they are likely to be the least-cost insurers of their
own negligence.184
In the majority of states, the policy of freedom of contract typically
outweighs other policies, with the exception of areas of public interest.185
“Freedom of contract is generally believed to be a good thing. And so is
the concept that one who acts negligently should be held responsible for the
injury caused by his or her act.”186 In the context of alarm service
contracts, holding alarm companies accountable for damages caused by
their negligence is an area of public interest courts should consider.
Enforcing underliquidated damages clauses in alarm service contracts
creates an incentive for alarm service providers to pay a nominal fee rather
than spend the appropriate level of resources to reduce the rate of their own
negligence.187 Here, the social interest in avoiding the needless waste
associated with the inefficient use of resources “may be great enough that
freedom to limit liability for negligent injury to another’s . . . property
should be curtailed.”188 The question, then, is whether this social objective
is “important enough that individuals should not be permitted to interfere
with them by shifting the incidence of risks”189 and whether the courtroom
is an appropriate place to make this determination.
Public policy has been described as “a very unruly horse, and when once
you get astride it you never know where it will carry you.”190 Some have
argued that a court cannot properly weigh the advantages and disadvantages
of such policy decisions because the “primary function of a court is to
resolve the specific dispute before it.”191 Thus, “[u]nlike a legislature, a

182. See supra Part I.C.2.
183. See supra Part III.B.
184. See supra Part III.B.1.
185. Burnham, supra note 9, at 390.
186. Id. at 379.
187. See supra Part III.B.1.
188. Fritz, supra note 8, at 222.
189. Id.
190. Richardson v. Mellish (1824) 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303.
191. Guissinger, supra note 9, at 802; see Jonathan Cohen, Note, Judicial Control of the
Purse—School Finance Litigation in State Courts, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 1393, 1416 (1982)
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court cannot hold open hearings, inviting testimony as to costs, risks, etc.,
from all interested parties.”192 Accordingly, matters of public interest
might be addressed more effectively by legislatures rather than by courts.193
Indeed, the New York State Legislature has prohibited the owners of
pools, gymnasiums, places of amusement or recreation, or similar
establishments from disclaiming their liability for damages caused by the
owner’s negligence, declaring such limitations of liability “void as against
public policy and wholly unenforceable.”194 A legislature could similarly
declare limitations of liability for damages caused by an alarm company’s
negligence to be void as a matter of public policy. A state-by-state
legislative solution has the additional appeal of allowing elected
representatives, rather than judges, to make the determination of whether
freedom of contract outweighs the importance of holding negligent parties
accountable for the injuries they cause. This decision may differ based on
the ideals of the citizenry in each state.
A legislative solution also may have benefits in terms of certainty.195
Clear rules regarding liability would allow alarm service companies to price
their services to reflect their exposure to liability. The alarm-company-asbest-insurer-of-its-own-negligence argument works only if the alarm
company knows about its liability in advance so that it can price its service
accordingly. Additionally, the efficiency benefits from the alarm company
acting as the least-cost insurer may be reduced if liability is excessively
litigated after every incident. A clear public policy statement from a state’s
legislature regarding the enforceability of limitations of liability for an
alarm company’s negligence could curtail litigation by making the outcome
of these lawsuits more certain.
Overall, the extreme discrepancy between actual damages and
underliquidated damages in a typical case where an alarm company
negligently fails to provide its contractual services, along with the
efficiency and public policy gains from holding alarm companies liable for
their own negligence, favor finding limitation-of-liability clauses in alarm
service contracts unconscionable and contrary to public policy. Applying
an unconscionability and public policy test strikes at the heart of the
matter—whether these clauses are too unfair to enforce—rather than
creating loopholes, and it provides the additional benefit of allowing state
legislatures to weigh in on the matter.

(discussing how “[r]emedies are granted on a case-by-case basis,” while “legislatures
traditionally focus on the problems of society as a whole”).
192. Guissinger, supra note 9, at 802.
193. Id. at 802–03; see DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 23
(1977) (“[M]any aspects of adjudication that seem well suited to the determination of
particular controversies seem unsuited to the making of general policy.”).
194. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-326 (McKinney 2012).
195. See HOROWITZ, supra note 193, at 37 (describing how the “piecemeal quality of
judicial decisions” can “unsettle old patterns without providing unambiguous new patterns to
which expectations can conform”).
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CONCLUSION
Limitation-of-liability clauses in alarm service contracts present a unique
challenge for courts.
Unlike exculpatory clauses in contracts for
recreational activities, which relieve a party from liability for damages
caused by negligence while providing a service, limitation-of-liability
clauses in alarm service contracts limit an alarm company’s liability for
negligently failing to provide bargained-for services. However, unlike a
true liquidated damages provision, limitation-of-liability clauses do not
purport to estimate the harm caused by nonperformance. How, then, should
courts determine their enforceability? Should they be enforced at all?
A policy that refuses to enforce limitation-of-liability clauses in alarm
service contracts on the basis that they are unenforceable penalties may
simply create a loophole to be exploited by clever drafting. Ultimately, the
real question is whether these provisions are unconscionable or void as a
matter of public policy. As a market exists for alarm services, courts are
unlikely to find these provisions procedurally unconscionable. However,
the conventional explanations for why limitation-of-liability clauses are not
substantively unconscionable or contrary to public policy are unconvincing.
Refusing to enforce these clauses would not force alarm companies to
become general casualty insurers. Rather, alarm companies would be
insurers only against their own negligence.
As alarm companies
themselves—not third-party insurers—are the least-cost insurers of their
own negligence, holding alarm companies accountable for their own
negligence would advance public policy interests.
While freedom of contract is an important concept, so is the notion that a
party should be held accountable for negligently injuring others. When
these two concepts conflict, public policy considerations may tip the scales
in favor of one or the other. Here, the obligation of care owed by alarm
service companies to their customers outweighs the traditional regard for
freedom of contract. When it comes to provisions in alarm service
contracts that limit an alarm company’s liability for damages caused by its
own negligence, public policy favors holding alarm companies responsible
for their negligence.

